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NOTES
A LEGISLATIVE APPROACH TO ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION
Although the technique of heterologous artificial insemination
(AID)1 has been practiced in the United States for more than fifty
years2 and has resulted in the birth of a significant number of children,8
there has been little litigation and virtually no legislation on the legal
issues involved. The failure of lawmakers to resolve the legal problems
surrounding AID has left all partie§involved unsure of their rights and
liabilities.4 For example, husbands, wives, physicians, and donors must
question whether AID itself violates public policy, whether adultery
has been committed, whether birth records have been falsified within
the meaning of criminal statutes, and whether liability for support of
the child has been incurred. The children produced remain doubtful of
their legitimacy and inheritance rights.5
Legislative bills concerning AID have been introduced in at least
seven states since World War 11.6 The first successful enactment oc-
1 Heterologous artificial insemination (AID) is the technique by which the semen of a
third-party donor is introduced into the reproductive system of a woman (recipient) by
mechanical means in an attempt to induce conception and pregnancy. In homologous ar-
tificial insemination (AIH) the semen of the husband is utilized. When the husband has
normal semen but for some reason cannot effectuate pregnancy through sexual intercourse,
AIH may be employed. AID is utilized when the wife is fertile but the husband is sterile
or impotent, or suffers from a hereditary disease which should not be transmitted to his
children, or when there is a serious Rh factor incompatability.
:2 For the history of artificial insemination, see W. GLOVER, ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION
AMONG HUMAN BEINGS (1948); Verkauf, Artificial Insemination: Progress, Polemics, and
Confusion-An Appraisal of Current Medico-Legal Status, 3 HOUSTON L. REv. 277 (1966);
Note, Social and Legal Aspects of Human Artificial Insemination, 1965 Wis. L. Rxv. 859.
3 The total number of births resulting from artificial insemination in the United
States has been estimated at from 50,000 to 200,000. Levisohn, Dilemma in Parenthood-
Socio-Legal Aspects of Human Artificial Insemination, 4 J. FORENSIC M.D. 147, 148 (1957).
More recent estimates place the number of annual AID conceptions in the United States
at from 5,000 to 20,000. See Guttmacher, Artificial Insemination, 97 ANNAmS N.Y. AcAD.
Sc. 623, 624 (1962).
4 For discussion of the various legal issues raised by AID, see Holloway, Artificial In-
semination: An Examination of the Legal Aspects, 43 A.B.A.J. 1089 (1957); LoGatto, Artifi-
cial Insemination: 1. Legal Aspects, 1 CATHOLIC LAWYER 172 (1955); Rice, A..D-An Heir
of Controversy, 34 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 510 (1959); Verkauf, supra note 2; Note, The
Socio-Legal Problems of Artificial Insemination, 28 IND. L.J. 620 (1953); Note, supra note 2.
5 The danger of incestuous marriages among children produced by AID has also
been raised by those opposing legitimization of such children. Petz, Artificial Insemination
-Legal Aspects, 34 U. DET. Lj. 404, 417 (1957); Rice, supra note 4, at 528. See pp. 511-12
infra.
6 Indiana, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Virginia, and Wisconsin. For iden-
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
curred in 1967, when the Oklahoma legislature legalized the practice of
AID and legitimized the children so conceived.7 The statute also estab-
lishes minimal procedural controls over the practice of AID. The Okla-
homa enactment provides an effective vehicle for evaluating various so-
lutions to the legal problems of AID and for further defining the ques-
tions that remain unanswered.8 The Oklahoma statute provides:
§ 551. Authorization
The technique of heterologous artificial insemination may be
performed in this State by persons duly authorized to practice med-
icine at the request and with the consent in writing of the hus-
band and wife desiring the utilization of such technique for the
purpose of conceiving a child or children.
§ 552. Status of child
Any child or children born as the result thereof shall be consid-
ered at law in all respects the same as a naturally conceived legiti-
mate child of the husband and wife so requesting and consenting to
the use of such technique.
§ 553. Persons authorized-Consent
No person shall perform the technique of heterologous artifi-
cial insemination unless currently licensed to practice medicine in
this State, and then only at the request and with the written consent
of the husband and wife desiring the utilization of such technique.
The said consent shall be executed and acknowledged by both the
husband and wife and the person who is to perform the technique,
and the judge having jurisdiction over adoption of children, and an
original thereof shall be filed under the same rules as adoption pa-
pers. The written consent so filed shall not be open to the general
public, and the information contained therein may be released only
to the persons executing such consent, or to persons having a legiti-
mate interest therein as evidenced by a specific court order.9
I
TiE LEGALITY OF AID
No legislative body has ever declared AID illegal, though bills to
prohibit the technique have been introduced in at least two states.10
Two judges have condemned AID as contrary to public policy and good
tification of bill numbers, years, and positions of all of these bills except Oklahoma's,
see Note, supra note 2, at 882.
7 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §f 551-53 (Supp. 1967).
s For discussion of the theological, sod6logical, and moral aspects of AID, see W.
GLOvER, supra note 2; LoGatto, Artificial Insemination: II. Ethical and Sociological As-
pects, 1 CATHOLic LAwY_ 267 (1955); Verkauf, supra note 2; Note, supra note 2.
9 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 551-53 (Supp. 1967).
10 See Note, supra note 2, at 882, indicating that such bills were introduced in Minne-
sota in 1949 and in Ohio in 1955.
[Vol. 53:497
ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION
morals." Several commentators have recommended that it be prohib-
ited,12 and one has urged that it be made a criminal offense for both
physician and donor.'3 By expressly authorizing AID and providing a
procedure that must be followed by participants, the Oklahoma legisla-
ture has made it clear that the piractice of AID is legal in that state.
The only other present indication of governmental approval of
AID is found in the New York City Health Code.14 That code does not
authorize AID in terms as positive and clear as those of the Oklahoma
11 Doornbos v. Doornbos, 23 U.S.L.W. 2308 (Super. Ct., Cook County, Ill., Dec. 13,
1954), appeal dismissed on procedural grounds, 12 Il. App. 2d 473, 139 N.E.2d 844 (1956);
Orford v. Orford, 58 D.L.R. 251, 259 (1921).
12 161 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 386, 403 (1949); Comment, Natural Law and Artifi-
cial Insemination, 5 CATHOLIC U.L. Rtv. 189, 191 (1955); Comment, Legal Problems of Ar-
tificial Insemination, 39 MARq. L. REv. 146, 152 (1955); Note, Artificial Insemination Versus
Adoption, 34 VA. L. REv. 822, 829 (1948).
13 Rice, supra note 4, at 528. Others have argued that to make AID a criminal offense
would only drive the practice underground and beyond the control of responsible medical
practitioners. G. WILLAMS, THE SANcTrrY OF LIE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 112 (1957); 161
PAR.-. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 386, 422 (1949); Pollard, Report on the Departmental Committee
on Human Artificial Insemination, 24 MoDRN L. REv. 158, 163 (1961); Note, Nullity-Ar-
tificial Insemination, 12 MODERN L. R v. 384, 387 (1949). See also Verkauf, supra note 2, at
299.
14 NEW YORK, N.Y., HEALTH CODE art. 21 (1959) (formerly NEW YoRE, N.Y., SANITARY
CODE § 112) provides in pertinent part:
§ 21.01 Physician to perform artificial insemination and collect seminal fluid
No person other than a licensed physician shall perform an artificial insemi-
nation or collect, offer for sale, sell or give away human seminal fluid for the pur-
pose of causing artificial insemination.
§ 21.03 Examination of donor and recipient
(a) A proposed donor of seminal fluid shall have a standard serological test for
syphilis and a smear and culture for gonorrhea within one week before his seminal
fluid is taken and, immediately prior to taking his seminal fluid, he shall be given
a complete medical examination with particular attention to his &22talia.
(b) A proposed donor and a proposed recpientof sem-i-nal fluid shall each
have a blood test to establish their respective Rh factors before artificial insemina-
tion is attempted. Such test shall be made by a laboratory operated pursuant to
Article 13 and classified for hematology, including blood grouping and Rh typing.
If the proposed recipient is negative for the Rh factor, only seminal fluid from a
donor who is also negative for the Rh factor shall be used.
§ 21.05 Disqualification of donors
A person who is affected with a venereal disease, tuberculosis, brucellosis or
who has any congenital disease or defect shall not be used as a donor of seminal
fluid for artificial insemination.
§ 21.07 Records; contents and confidentiality
(a) A physician who performs an artificial insemination shall keep a record of
(1) the names and addresses of the physician, donor and recipient, (2) the results
of the medical examination and serological and all other tests, and (3) the date of
the artificial insemination.
(b) Records kept by a physician pursuant to this section shall not be subject
to inspection by persons other than authorized personnel of the Department. A
person who has access to these records shall not divulge any part thereof so as to
disclose the identity of the persons to whom they relate.
1968]
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statute, but approval of the techinque seems implicit in the controls
placed on its practice.
A. Adultery by the Recipient
In the absence of a statutory definition of adultery that specifically
includes AID or the processes by which it is performed,15 it is doubtful
that a criminal prosecution based on the practice of AID would be in-
stituted. In several civil actions for divorce, however, courts have faced
the question whether the practice of AID can constitute adultery, and
have reached conflicting decisions. The confusion results from attempts
to apply traditional concepts of adultery to a scientific innovation that
early common law jurists never had occasion to consider.
The earliest case equating AID with adultery is Orford v. Orford.16
The court found that pregnancy had occurred as the result of sexual in-
tercourse with a man other than the husband and that the wife's con-
tention that she was impregnated through AID was not to be believed.
In a famous dictum that has since plagued proponents of AID, Justice
Orde stated:
In my judgement, the essence of the offence of adultery consists,
not in the moral turpitude of the act of sexual intercourse, but in
the voluntary surrender to another person of the reproductive pow-
ers or faculties of the guilty person; and any submission of those
powers to the service or enjoyment of any person other than the
husband or the wife comes within the definition of "adultery."17
In Hoch v. Hoch,'1 a soldier sued for divorce after returning from
military duty to find his wife pregnant. While the wife's allegation that
conception had been achieved through AID was rejected, the court
suggested that AID would be insufficient for divorce on the ground of
adultery. But nine years later another Illinois court stated in a declara-
tory judgment that "[h]eterologous artificial insemination ... with or
15 Adultery is generally defined as the voluntary sexual intercourse of a married per-
son with an individual other than the offender's husband or wife. For discussion of various
definitions of adultery, see MacLennan v. MacLennan, 1958 Sess. Cas. 105, 108, 1958 Scots.
L.T.R. 12, 14; Orford v. Orford, 58 D.L.R. 251, 256 (1921); Moore, The Diverse Definitions
of Criminal Adultery, 30 U. KAN. CiTy L. REv. 219 (1962). Glanville Williams has com-
mented, with reference to the New York City Health Code: "If donor insemination is adul-
tery in the law of New York, it is the only form of adultery for which the procedure has
been put into legislative form." G. WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 125.
16 58 D.L.R. 251 (1921).
17 Id. at 258.
18 Unreported, Cir. Ct., Cook County, Ill. (1945); see TIME, Feb. 26, 1945, at 58.
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without the consent of husband, is contrary to public policy and good
morals, and constitutes adultery on the part of the mother."' 9
In the case of MacLennan v. MacLennan,20 the court carefully an-
alyzed the English law on adultery and arrived at a different conclusion.
Lord Wheatley found that adultery required two parties physically pre-
sent and engaging in the sexual act at the same time, with some degree
of penetration of the female organ by the male organ.2 1 Noting that
these requirements are not fulfilled by AID, he held that the practice
does not constitute adultery, whether the husband consents or not.22 He
added:
If it be that science has created a casus improvisus, the remedy is
not to be found in fitting such a case into one of the existing
grounds of divorce on arguments which cannot logically or physio-
logically be supported.23
The Oklahoma statute appears to protect the wife inseminated by
AID from her consenting husband's subsequent allegations of adultery,
regardless of how the offense is defined. The various reasons supporting
public condemnation of adultery, such as the introduction of a false
strain of blood 24 or an unwanted heir25 into the family, disruption of
the family system, 26 alienation of the wife's affections, 27 and the burden-
ing of the husband with the support of an unwanted child biologically
foreign to him,28 are rendered inapposite by the husband's consent to
AID.20 Indeed, divorce based on adultery might be barred by constru-
ing the husband's consent as connivance.30
19 Doornbos v. Doornbos, 23 U.S.L.W. 2308 (Super. Ct., Cook County, Ill., Dec. 13,
1954), appeal dismissed on procedural grounds, 12 IIL. App. 2d 473, 139 N.E.2d 844 (1956).
20 1958 Sess. Cas. 105, 1958 Scots L.T.R. 12.
21 Id. at 113, 1958 Scots L.T.R. at 17.
22 Id. at 114, 1958 Scots L.T.R. at 18.
23 Id. at 115, 1958 Scots L.T.R. at 18.
24 See Orford v. Orford, 58 D.L.R. 251, 258 (1921).
25 See Hager, Artificial Insemination: Some Practical Considerations for Effective
Counseling, 39 N.C.L. Rev. 219, 234 (1961).
26 See Petz, supra note 5, at 413.
27 See id.; Note, The Socio-Legal Problems of Artificial Insemination, 28 IND. L.J.
620, 626 (1953).
28 See Tallin, Artificial Insemination, 34 CAN. B. REv. 1, 18 (1956); Note, supra note
27, at 625.
29 See 35 CoNELL L.Q. 183 (1949).
80 See Lang, Does Artificial Insemination Constitute Adultery?, 2 MANrroBA L.J. 87, 96
(1966); Note, supra note 2, at 876. N.Y. Doms. REL. LAw § 171 (McKinney 1964) provides
that the plaintiff is not entitled to a divorce, although the adultery is established (1) where
the offense was committed by the procurement or with the connivance of the plaintiff, or
(2) where the offense has been forgiven by the plaintiff.
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The Oklahoma statute offers no protection, however, to a wife who
is impregnated through AID without her husband's consent. The birth
of a child so conceived might be as objectionable to the husband as one
resulting from adulterous sexual intercourse. When such a situation is
presented in a divorce action, courts now face the difficult task of either
burdening the husband with an unwanted child and an untrustworthy
wife or finding adultery by the wife where there has been neither the
sexual intercourse required by the usual definition of that offense nor
the moral turpitude implicit in it. A third alternative available in most
states is to find that resort to AID without consent constitutes extreme
cruelty to the husband and thus justifies divorce.31 If a legislature deter-
mines that an AID conception without consent of the husband is itself
sufficient grounds for divorce, it should so specify and thereby give
guidance to the courts. 32
B. Adultery by the Donor
Whereas the Orford characterization of adultery-a surrender of
the reproductive faculties33-may have some validity in the case of a
wife inseminated without her husband's consent, it might seem unrea-
sonable to apply it to a donor accused of that offense by his wife. Al-
though his reproductive powers are utilized by another, no spurious
heir is introduced into his family, nor is the moral turpitude of sexual
intercourse outside of the marital relationship present. Such a line of
reasoning, however, ignores other interests of the donor's wife. The do-
nor's siring children by other women may be repugnant to his wife re-
gardless of the method used. To protect all parties concerned, an AID
statute should require the consent of the donor's wife as well as the con-
sent of the recipient's husband.3 4 This would serve to prevent any fric-
tion that might arise as a result of the AID procedure. There is, how-
ever, no reason to require that either the donor or the recipient be
informed of the identity of the other.3 5
31 See Lang, supra note 30, at 97; Note, Artificial Insemination-Its Socio-Legal As-
pects, 33 MINN. L. RLv. 145, 152 (1949).
32 That AID without the husband's consent should be made a separate ground for
divorce, was recommended by the Royal Commission on Marriage ard Divorce and by the
Departmental Committee on Human Artificial Insemination. See Pollard, supra note 13,
at 159. Such legislation has been enacted in New Zealand. See Matrimonial Proceedings Act
of 1963, No. 71, § 21(1)(b) (N.Z.).
33 Orford v. Orford, 58 D.L.R. 251, 258 (1921); see p. 500 supra.
84 The AMA has recognized the desirability of obtaining the consent of the donor's
wife. AMA, MmscoLEcAL FoRMs 43 (1961).
35 Proponents of AID uniformly advocate complete anonymity of donors and recipi-
ents. This prevents problems that might otherwise arise, such as transfer of the wife's affec-
tions from her husband to the biological father of her child and the possibli opportunity
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II
THE AID CHILD
A. Legal Status
Most authorities agree that the AID child is illegitimate solely be-
cause his natural parents are not married to each other.86 In a 1963 an-
nulment action, Gursky v. Gursky,37 a New York court held an AID
child illegitimate, stating that the disinclination of the legislature to le-
gitimize AID children indicated its unwillingness to disturb the appli-
cation of the historical concept of illegitimacy to such individuals.38
Yet, in Strnad v. Strnad,39 a 1948 New York decision, the court rejected
a wife's contention that her AID offspring was illegitimate and granted
visitation privileges to the husband. Consider the confusion in the
minds of AID parents who had relied on the Strnad decision when the
Gursky holding was announced fifteen years later.
Some protection is afforded the AID child by the presumption of
legitimacy extended to children born of married women.40 To give full
effect to this presumption, some writers recommend that no records of
AID be maintained 41 or that semen of the husband be mixed with that
of the donor prior to insemination.42 Others recommend that blood
types of donor and husband be matched.43 The aim of such deception is
for blackmail by the donor. See Guttmacher, supra note 3, at 627; Guttmacher, The Role
of Artificial Insemination in the Treatment of Sterility, 15 OBsr. & GYNEC. SuRv. 767, 775
(1960); LoGatto, supra note 8, at 272; Seymour & Koerner, Medico-Legal Aspects of Artifi-
cial Insemination, 107 JA.MA. 1531 (1936); Tallin, supra note 28, at 8.
36 Doornbos v. Doornbos, 23 U.S.L.W. 2308 (Super. Ct., Cook County, IIL., Dec. 13,
1954), appeal dismissed on procedural grounds, 12 Ill. App. 2d 473, 139 N.E.2d 844 (1956);
Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963); G. WiLUAms, supra
note 13, at 118; Weinberger, A Partial Solution to Legitimacy Problems Arising from the
Use of Artificial Insemination, 35 IND. L.J. 143, 148 (1960).
37 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
38 Id. at 1087, 242 N.Y.S.2d at 410.
39 190 Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
40 See, e.g., In re Findlay, 253 N.Y. 1, 7, 170 N.E. 471, 472 (1930) (Cardozo, J.); 9 J.
WIGMO2E, EvMENcF § 2527 (3d ed. 1940). "That a child born of a married woman during
wedlock is presumed to be the child of her then husband is uniformly conceded." Id.
§ 2527, at 448. The strength of the presumption, however, varies among jurisdictions.
"Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the issue of a wife cohabiting with her
husband, who is not impotent, is conclusively presumed to be legitimate." CAL. Evm. CoDE
§ 621 (West 1966); cf. N.Y. Domr. Rt. LAw § 175 (McKinney 1964). For judicial interpreta-
tion of the California presumption, see Jackson v. Jackson, 67 Cal. 2d 241, 430 P.2d 289, 60
Cal. Rptr. 649 (1967).
41 E.g., Guttmacher, supra note 3, at 627; Guttmacher, The Role of Artificial Insemi-
nation in the Treatment of Sterility, supra note 35, at 775.
42 E.g., Weinberger, supra note 36, at 152.
43 E.g., id.; Seymour & Koerner, supra note 35; Verkauf, supra note 2, at 284; Note,
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to make proof of the child's AID origin difficult or impossible and
thereby to render the presumption of legitimacy virtually conclusive.
When proof of AID and of the impossibility of natural conception are
properly before a court, however, the child will probably be held illegit-
imate.44 Disregarding the obvious injustice to the child, such a result
appears inconsistent with the policies underlying the legitimacy classifi-
cation of individuals as dependent upon the marital relationship of
their parents. The basic reason for the social distinction probably rests
in the Christian religion's concept of the monogamous marriage,45
its concern for stability of the family, and its aversion to illicit sex.4 6
Legislative discrimination against illegitimates can be traced in large
part to the self-interest of male legislators who wished to insulate them-
selves and their families from claims by accidental, extra-marital off-
spring.47 These policies do not appear to be violated in the case of the
AID child who was brought into the world only after extremely thor-
ough planning, in contrast to the lack of foresight that results in the
birth of most illegitimate children. Under common AID practice, the
husband and wife undergo extensive examinations to determine the
cause of their childless condition, and the physician evaluates their psy-
chological fitness to receive an AID child.48 The physician selects a do-
nor whose mental and physical characteristics resemble those of the
husband. In addition, the husband expressly consents to the addition of
the child to his family. It is illogical to subject the individual produced
through such positive efforts to the same stigma of illegitimacy as the
unwanted, unplanned child conceived and born out of wedlock.
The Oklahoma AID statute declares that the child "shall be con-
sidered at law in all respects the same as a naturally conceived legiti-
mate child of the husband and wife . . . ."4 The legislature has thus
corrected the principal defect of most of the existing case law, which
declared such children illegitimate whether or not such a declaration
supra note 27, at 639. The value of blood tests as a means of proving non-paternity is now
widely accepted. See Jackson v. Jackson, 67 Cal. 2d 241. 430 P.2d 289, 60 Cal. Rptr. 649
(1967); Oliver v. England, 48 Misc. 2d 335, 264 N.Y.S.2d 999 (Fain. Ct. 1965); CAL. Evm.
CODE §§ 892, 895 (West 1966); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 106/, § 1 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1966); N.Y.
FAMmY CT. Acr § 532 (McKinney 1963); C. McCoRace, EVIDENCE §§ 177-78 (1954); Ross,
The Value of Blood Tests As Evidence in Paternity Cases, 71 HAnv. L. REv. 466 (1958).
44 See note 36 supra.
45 See W. Far ,EDANN, LAw IN A CHANGING SociEry 251 (1959).
46 See Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MicH. L. REv. 477, 498-99
(1967).
47 Id. at 498.
48 See Guttmacher, supra note 3, at 629; Guttmacher, The Role of Artificial Insemina-
tion in the Treatment of Sterility, supra note 35, at 775; Verkauf, supra note 2, at 283.
49 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 552 (Supp. 1967).
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was necessary to the decision at hand. The inclusion of similar legitimiz-
ing sections in all bills introduced in support of AID50 demonstrates the
concern of sponsoring legislators for the inequity of applying the illegit-
imacy concept in the AID situation.
This section of the statute could have important effects on the de-
velopment of AID. Other states may now feel less reluctant to consider
the issue seriously, since one has already taken the step. Childless
couples may be less hesitant to use the technique if the child's legiti-
macy is assured.5 1 The statute may also eliminate litigation of the
child's legitimacy. All parties will thus be spared the embarrassment
that results from publicity of the legitimacy determination. The statute
will probably have no effect, however, upon the use of AID without the
husband's consent or upon the status of children so conceived.
The question of the statute's retroactivity remains. Should AID
children already born acquire the status of legitimacy as the result of
the 1967 enactment? To effectuate state policy and to relieve living AID
children of uncertainty and of the possible burden of illegitimacy, the
statute should be retroactive. Where the husband and wife have con-
sented in writing to the practice of AID, a present filing of the written
consent may satisfy the statutory requirements. Alternatively, the writ-
ing may be admissible as evidence in future litigation. 2 Where there is
no written proof of consent, but other evidence exists, the court should
rely upon the probable intent of the parties at the time of insemination.
Though the parties may have been unsure of the child's status at that
time, it is improbable that AID was requested on the assumption that
the illegitimacy of the resulting children would avoid some future obli-
gation. The court could, on public policy grounds, hold the party es-
topped to make such an assertion. By invoking the legislative intent in
passing the new statute, a court could properly legitimize such AID
children.
B. Support Obligations of Husband and Donor
Two New York courts have held consenting husbands liable for
50 See Note, supra note 2, at 882.
51 One questionnaire survey of 200 women produced 82 replies. Of those responding,
62% would resort to AID if their husband were sterile; 77% would not utilize AID if the
children were held by the courts to be illegitimate; but 84% would prefer AID to adoption
if the children were held to be leitimate. A vast majority believed there should be no dis-
tinction in the legal status of children born by AID and those conceived naturally, and
also favored legislation legitimizing AID children if the courts were to hold them illegiti-
mate otherwise. Levisohn, supra note 3, at 170. See also Verkauf, supra note 2, at 291.
52 See Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963); People v.
Sorenson, 254 Cal. App. 2d 869, 62 Cal. Rptr. 462 (1967).
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support payments despite the child's illegitimacy. In Gursky v. Gursky,53
the court found in the husband's express consent, followed by the wife's
concurrence and submission to AID, an implied contract to support the
child. Liability was also based on the alternative ground of equitable es-
toppel. The second case also relied on the implied contract theory to
impose liability for support.5 4
By equating the AID child with a naturally conceived, legitimate
child, the Oklahoma statute effectively imposes on the husband and
wife the obligation to support that child. The statute's effect is thus
similar to that of a final decree of adoption, whereby all rights, duties,
and other legal consequences of the natural relation of child and parent
are established between the child and the adopting parents."5
Apparently no court has imposed liability for support of an AID
child on a nonconsenting husband. Since this husband is not the natu-
ral father of the child and has not induced any reliance on the part of
his wife prior to conception, no such obligation should arise. Because
the Oklahoma statute does not affect the status of AID children con-
ceived without the husband's consent, courts can still find them illegiti-
mate and thereby relieve the husband of the burden of support. On the
other hand, the husband probably could be held liable if, subsequent to
the child's conception, he contracts with his wife for support of the
child,5 6 or if he makes representations of paternity to the AID child and
53 39 Misc. 2d 1088, 1089, 242 N.Y.S2d 406, 412 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
54 Anonymous v. Anonymous, 41 Misc. 2d 886, 246 N.Y.S.2d 835 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
55 E.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 60.16 (1966):
(1) After the final decree of adoption is entered, the relation of parent and
child and all the rights, duties and other legal consequences of the natural rela-
tion of child and parent shall thereafter exist between such adopted child and the
adoptive parents adopting such child and the kindred of the adoptive parents.
From the date of the final decree of adoption, the child shall be entitled to inherit
real and personal property from and through the adoptive parents in accordance
with the statutes of descent and distribution, and the adoptive parents shall be
entitled to inherit real and personal property from and through the child in
accordance with said statutes.
(2) After a final decree of adoption is entered, the natural parents of the
adopted child, unless they are the adoptive parents or the spouse of an adoptive
parent, shall be relieved of all parental responsibilities for said child and have no
rights over such adopted child or to his property by descent and distribution.
Both adoption and AID statutes establish a legal relationship between the child and
the couple into whose home he is being accepted. The adoption decree also severs the
child's legal relationship with his natural parents. It may be argued, by analogy, that the
AID statute should sever any such bond between the donor and his AID child. Unless
such an approach is taken, the AID child is in the peculiar position of having two men
being treated by law as his natural father.
56 Clevenger v. Clevenger, 189 Cal. App. 2d 658, 667, 11 Cal. Rptr. 707, 712 (1961):
[W]e see no theoretical reason why a contract for the support of an illegitimate
child during its minority between the mother and the mother's husband would not
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induces reliance on them.57
If the husband is liable for support when he has consented to AID,
it might seem logical to impose liability on the donor when the hus-
band has not consented. Imposition of this obligation would reduce the
need for community support of AID children and would deter insemi-
nation without the husband's consent. But such donor liability poses
special problems. Because of the secrecy normally maintained in AID,
the wife has no knowledge of the identity of the donor. The physician
may have kept no records matching donors with recipients. The threat
of support liability would compel the donor to ascertain the identity of
the recipient in order to assure himself that the husband had consented,
that the recipient and her husband would adequately support the child,
and that he would be legally protected in subsequent proceedings.5 8
Disclosure of the donor's and recipient's identities might lead to such
problems as transfer of the wife's affections from husband to donor and
increased feelings of inferiority on the part of the husbland.59 As a com-
promise solution a legislature should consider placing some degree of li-
ability for support upon the physician or other person performing an
insemination without the husband's consent. In this way, the secrecy of
identities would be maintained and the child would still have a source
of support. Moreover, such a provision would effectively discourage the
practice of AID without the husband's consent, since few practitioners
would subject themselves to the potential support liability.
C. Inheritance Rights
Apparently no court has determined the inheritance rights of an
AID child. In the Gursky and Strnad cases the courts expressly declined
be enforceable. The husband receives as consideration the custody and control of
the child as well as the right to its earnings. [Footnotes omitted.]
57 Id. at 671, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 714:
If the facts should show, however, that the husband represented to the boy
that he was his father, that the husband intended that his representation be ac-
cepted and acted upon by the child, that the child relied upon the representation
and treated the husband as his father and gave his love and affection to him, that
the child was ignorant of the true facts, we would have the foundation of the ele-
ments of estoppel.
58 Imposing support obligations on the donor has been suggested as a means of elimi-
nating AID, since the number of willing donors would be substantially reduced by such a
liability. Rice, supra note 4, at 521; Petz, supra note 5, at 423; cf. Richardson, Artificial In-
semination, 30 Ausm. L.J. 125 (1956), where it is suggested that the donor and doctor be
relieved from all rights and liabilities in any way connected with the matter.
The Arizona legitimacy statute states: "Every child is the legitimate child of its natural
parents and is entitled to support and education as if born in lawful wedlock . A... z.
RL v. STAT. ANN. § 14-206 (1956). This statute may have the unexpected result of making
the donor liable for support of his AID children.
59 See note 35 supra.
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to consider the question. In Doornbos v. Doornbos,60 the court's state-
ment that the husband has no right or interest in the AID child suggests
that the child may have no right or interest in the estate of the husband.
Whether an illegitimate person may inherit from his natural father un-
der state intestacy laws61 is not the issue in considering the AID hus-
band's estate, since it is conceded that the husband is not the child's bio-
logical father.
The key phrase in the Oklahoma statute is found in section 552.
The declaration of legitimacy raises the presumption that the normal
pattern of inheritance will operate within the family. The statute se-
cures the child's right to share in the husband's estate as well as in es-
tates devised to the husband's issue or children. Although some writers
have indicated that such a result may be contrary to the intent of the
original testator,62 a comparable right of inheritance has been granted
by statute to the adopted child in order to equate his status to that of
the natural child.6 3 To hold that the AID child does not have the same
right as an adopted child seems contrary to the legislative objectives un-
derlying the AID statute.
What are the rights of child and donor with respect to inheritance
from each other? Where the husband has consented to AID, the statute
should sever all rights and responsibilities between the child and its
natural father. Such is the effect of an adoption decree.64 But if the hus-
band has not consented to AID and if the child is held illegitimate, then
the child might arguably be entitled to share in the donor's estate to
the same extent that other illegitimate children are allowed by statute
to share in the estates of their natural fathers.65 The objections to hold-
60 23 U.S.L.W. 2308 (Super. Ct., Cook County, Ill., Dec. 13, 1954), appeal dismissed on
procedural grounds, 12 Ill. App. 2d 473, 139 N.E.2d 844 (1956).
61 E.g., ARtz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-206 (1956), provides: "Every child shall inherit
from its natural parents and from their kindred heir, lineal and collateral, in the same
manner as children born in lawful wedlock." See G. WLAMS, supra note 13, at 121;
Schwab, Artificial Insemination and the Law, 1963 ABA SEcrIoN Or FAmILY LAW, PRoaomn-
INGS 104, 112.
82 E.g., Petz, supra note 5, at 421. Williams has suggested that the descent of titles of
honor and entailed interests might have to be treated differently because of the public's
emotional interest in the "blood" of the holder. G. WLIAMS, supra note 13, at 144. See
also Verkauf, supra note 2, at 304.
63 E.g., CAL. Civ. COD § 228 (West 1954); N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 117 (McKinney 1964);
OKrA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 60.16 (1966). For the relevant portions of the text of the Okla-
homa statute, see note 55 supra.
64 E.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 60.16 (1966); see note 55 supra.
65 E.g., Asuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-206 (1956); CAL. PROB. CODE § 255 (West Supp.
1966); N.Y. Esr., Pow. & TRusTS LAw § 4-12 (McKinney 1967).
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ing the donor liable in these circumstances parallel the arguments
against his liability for support of the child.60
III
STATUTORY CONTROLS
The procedural controls specified by the Oklahoma statute are
minimal in comparison with others that have been proposed. 67 The
only conditions placed on use of AID are that the insemination be per-
formed by a qualified physician and that consent forms signed by the
husband, wife, and physician be filed in an appropriate court. Such re-
quirements seem designed primarily to produce reliable evidence of the
event and of the husband's consent. Also, the inconvenience involved
in filing may preclude hasty decisions to use the technique. In contrast
to the Oklahoma approach, the New York City Health Code places em-
phasis upon technological aspects by requiring serum, semen, and gen-
eral physical examinations of the donor.68
The Oklahoma statute can be criticized for leaving with the physi-
cians too much responsibility for selecting donors and evaluating
couples. It has been suggested that the selection procedure be conducted
by a team comprised of a physician, a psychiatrist, and a social worker
or lawyer in a manner somewhat similar to that followed in adoption
proceedings. 9 On the other hand, many writers feel that subjecting the
participants to such investigations is too reminiscent of the controlled
societies described in Brave New World and 1984. 70 Moreover, it has
been argued that AID applicants should not be subjected to such rigors
prior to conception, since fertile couples are not required to undergo
similar investigations to determine their fitness for parenthood. 71
Both the Oklahoma statute and the New York City Health Code
provide for restricted availability of records to the public. The relative
secrecy of AID and the desire to conceal infertility are factors often im-
portant to couples preferring AID to adoption.72 The secrecy provided
by the statute is further enhanced by the usual practice of listing hus-
band and wife as parents on the child's birth certificate1
66 See pp. 505-07 supra.
67 See Talin, Artificial Insemination, 34 CAN. B. REv. 166, 183-86 (1956); Comment,
Artificial Insemination: The Law's Illegitimate Child?, 9 ViLL. L. REV. 77, 83 (1963).
68 For text of Article 21 of the New York City Health Code, see note 14 supra.
69 See Richardson, supra note 58, at 126; Comment, supra note 67, at 84.
70 E.g., Comment, supra note 67, at 87.
71 Verkauf, supra note 2, at 293.
72 Id. at 291.
73 See Guttmacher, supra note 3, at 629; Guttmacher, The Role of Artificial Insemina-
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Listing the husband and wife as natural parents of AID children
has raised the issue of falsification of public records, which may lead to
criminal prosecution.7 4 The undermining of reliability of public re-
cords has been advanced as a further argument against AID.75 However,
legislatures have accepted that possibility in the case of the adopted
child. There is no reason to infer that Oklahoma intended a contrary
procedure in the case of AID, especially in light of the established prac-
tice of concealing the donor's identity. 76
IV
LEGISLATIVE INACTION
Because of the paucity of legislative materials, one can only specu-
late as to the reasons for the apparent reluctance of states to act on the
AID problem. In 1948 the New York County Lawyer's Association rec-
ommended disapproval of a bill legitimizing AID children on the
ground that the strong presumption of legitimacy 7 vitiated the need
for the bill.78 It was also feared that nonconsenting husbands might
fashion an argument, based on their exclusion from the coverage of the
bill, to rebut the presumption of legitimacy as applied to AID children
of their wives. Since that report it has become apparent that when proof
of AID origin appears in the records the courts will declare such chil-
dren illegitimate.79 In 1964 the same New York group recommended
passage of a similar bill to legitimize the children, emphasizing the
bill's requirement for the husband's consent.8 0 Had that bill been en-
acted, the AID child would have been accorded the same status as one
naturally conceived.
tion in the Treatment of Sterility, supra note 35, at 775; Rice, supra note 4, at 519. Al-
though the Oklahoma AID statute does not specify such a procedure, continued adherence
to it may be anticipated since it is the present practice and since a similar procedure is
followed after issuance of an adoption decree, which establishes an analogous legal rela-
tionship between parent and child. See note 55 supra; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 10433
(West 1964); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 4138 (McKinney Supp. 1967); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
63, § 1-316 (1964).
74 See G. WILTAMS, supra note 13, at 127; Holloway, supra note 4, at 1090.
75 See LoGatto, supra note 8, at 269; Rice, supra note 4, at 519.
76 See G. WLLIAMs, supra note 13, at 120.
77 See N.Y. Domt. RE. LAw § 175 (McKinney 1964).
78 N.Y. County Lawyers Ass'n Comm. on State Legislation, Rep. No. 114, March 8,
1948, recommending disapproval of (1948) Sen. Int. No. 745, Pr. No. 2042 (Mr. Friedman).
79 Doornbos v. Doornbos, 23 U.S.L.W. 2308 (Super. Ct., Cook County, IIl., Dec. 13,
1954), appeal dismissed on procedural grounds, 12 Ill. App. 2d 473, 139 N.E.2d 844 (1956);
Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc. 2d 1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
80 N.Y. County Lawyers Ass'n Comm. on State Legislation, Rep. No. 179, Feb. 25, 1964,
recommending approval of (1964) Sen. Int. No. 1882, Pr. No. 1922 (Mr. Liebowitz).
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In 1957 the Michigan State Bar Committee on Domestic Relations
Law noted that most legal difficulties accredited to AID were "more
fanciful than real." ' Relying upon the apparent lack of AID litigation,
the committee advised that the need for a legitimizing statute was not
sufficient to warrant the risks involved in overcoming the opposition
certain to follow the introduction of such a bill. The 1949 experience in
Minnesota involving legislative hearings on AID indicates the emo-
tional nature of the public response to discussions of such proposals.82
Also, the actual consideration and rejection of a bill legalizing AID
might result in an even greater state of uncertainty than presently ex-
ists.83
Legislative inaction is further encouraged by lack of public aware-
ness that a problem exists, by religious taboos, and by predictions of
dire sociological consequences of AID. There is hope, however, that
this social apathy will be overcome. An increasing incidence of AID liti-
gation may stimulate intelligent public discussion of the issues. Also the
reluctance of legislators to study the problem may diminish with the
passage of time and with increasing public recognition of the problem,
as demonstrated currently by the relatively open consideration of revi-
sions in abortion laws.8 4
One undesirable sociological consequence of AID is the increased
possibility of incestuous marriages.8 5 To date there are no figures avail-
able to support the suggestion of AID opponents that this may develop
into a serious problem. A proper evaluation of the probability of inces-
tuous marriages among AID offspring would entail a statistical analysis
of such factors as population figures, social strata of donors and recipi-
ents, mobility of society, age differences, use of semen banks across the
country, possible use of semen frozen for several years, and other social
81 Report of Subcomm. on Artificial Insemination, Mich. State Bar Comm. on Doam.
Rel. Law, reprinted in Note, Artificial Insemination on the Michigan Scene, 34 U. Dar. L.J.
473 (1957).
82 See Note, Artificial Insemination-Legal and Related Problems, 8 U. FLA. L. REv.
304, 315 (1955), which quotes a letter from the sponsor of the Minnesota AID bills indi-
cating the vicious abuse to which he and his family were subjected during hearings on the
bills.
83 See Report of Subcomm. on Artificial Insemination, supra note 81, at 475.
84 See, e.g., Leavy & Kummer, Abortion and the Population Crisis: Therapeutic Abor-
tion and the Law; Some New Approaches, 27 OHso ST. L.J. 647 (1966); Symposium: Abor-
tion and the Law, 17 W. Rr-s. L Ruv. 369 (1965); Comment, The Law of Therapeutic Abor-
tion: A Social Commentary on Proposed Reform, 15 J. PuB. L 386 (1966); NEw RxnuBmc,
Nov. 26, 1966, at 38; NEWSWEEK, July 3, 1967, at 51; TimB, Oct. 13, 1967, at 32.
85 E.g., G. WLLiA s, supra note 13, at 144; LoGatto, supra note 8, at 270; Rice, supra
note 4, at 528; Comment, Legal Problems of Artificial Insemination, 39 MARQ. L. REv. 146,
153 (1955).
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factors that might bias an estimate. Such a marriage would appear ex-
tremely unlikely.8 6 There may be an even greater likelihood of incestu-
ous marriages between adopted or illegitimate children of the same
father. Any risk of incest between AID children could be minimized
still further by limiting the number of inseminations by the same do-
nor.
8 7
CONCLUSION
The Oklahoma statute resolves the most pressing legal questions
concerning AID by legalizing use of the technique and by legitimizing
the children so produced providing the husband has consented. Legiti-
mization eradicates the different treatment of AID children and natu-
rally conceived legitimate children with respect to inheritance and sup-
port. The statute does not purport to affect the AID child conceived
without the husband's consent, nor does it condone such practice.
In order more fully to resolve the problems associated with AID,
legislatures should carefully analyze the probable sociological effects of
the practice and should pay less attention to hypothetical problems. If a
legislature decides to legalize AID without losing control of the prac-
tice and to legitimize the offspring, the following provisions should be
considered in addition to those of the Oklahoma statute:
(1) Physicians should maintain records indicating the name and ad-
dress of the donor(s) utilized for each recipient.
(2) Physicians should maintain records of the written consent of
the donor's wife, if any. Such consent should be renewed annually.
(3) A physician or other person performing an artificial insemina-
tion without the husband's written consent, properly filed, should be li-
able for support of the child produced thereby if the husband is subse-
quently declared not liable for such support.
(4) The semen from an individual donor may not be used to pro-
duce more than twenty AID children.88
S6 See Levisohn, Dilemma in Parenthood: Socio-Legal Aspects of Human Artificial In-
semination, 36 Cm.-KENT L. RIv. 1, 81 (1959); Verkauf, supra note 2, at 292.
87 G. WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 145. The British medical profession apparently lim-
its donors to 100 inseminations, though it is not clear whether this figure represents actual
impregnations or merely inseminations. Compare G. WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 140, with
161 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 418 (1949), and LoGatto, supra note 8, at 270. See also Note,
Artificial Insemination, 30 BRooKLYN L. R.v. 302, 321 (1964).
88 This number assumes that the apparent British limit of 100 inseminations is a
sound figure. If the woman were inseminated three times per month and a 100% conception
rate were achieved during the first month, each donor could theoretically father only 33 chil-
dren. Dr. Guttmacher has analyzed the results of 690 cases of AID published by seven clini-
cians and has found an average conception rate of about 69% after several months of in-
seminations. Guttmacher, supra note 3, at 629; Guttmacher, The Role of Artificial Insemi-
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(5) An AID child accepted into the family for more than one year
by a husband who has knowledge of its origin, but who did not consent
to the use of AID, should be treated in all respects the same as a nat-
urally conceived legitimate child of the husband and wife.
(6) All living persons conceived through AID with the husband's
consent should be treated in all respects the same as a naturally con-
ceived legitimate child of the husband and wife.
Harry S. Chandler
nation in the Treatment of Sterility, supra note 85, at 779; see Verkauf, supra note 2, at
288. Such a success rate during the first month of insemination would produce somewhat
less than 23 pregnancies per 100 inseminations on the above schedule. The figure ultimately
used by a legislature would have to be based on sound medical advice refining these esti-
mates and critically evaluating the risks involved in allowing increased prolificacy.
